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INTRODUCTION

In the two years since the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
was proposed as part of the Miami Summit of the Americas,' the 34
Summit countries2 have only slowly begun to tackle the difficult issues
attendant to creating an integration system of such a scale in this

t © 1997 Frank J. Garcia. All rights reserved.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University. J.D., University of Michigan (1989).
1. See generally Andres Oppenheimer & Christopher Marquis, Free Trade Giant Set in
Motion, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 11, 1994, at A34; John M. Goshko & Peter Behr, Leaders of
Western Hemisphere Agree to Form Free Trade Zone, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1994, at Al;
David E. Sanger, Chile is Admitted as North American Free Trade Partner,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1994, at A4.
2. All the countries of the Western Hemisphere save Cuba were represented.
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hemisphere by the year 2005.3 One of the most challenging issues will
be the development of institutions capable of effectively making decisions and resolving disputes concerning the implementation and interpretation of the future FTAA agreement.4 This issue is complicated by the
existence of numerous regional and subregional trade agreements (collectively "RTAs") throughout the hemisphere, 5 each with a different

3. See Ministers Leave Aside Key Details in Denver But Approve Main Blueprint, INSIDE
NAFTA SPECIAL REPORT, July 4, 1995, at 4 (review of results of first Post-Summit ministerial meeting). At this stage some analysts are even questioning whether the US will move
ahead at all. Analysts Split Over Likely Role of Latin Trade in Second Clinton Term, INSIDE
NAFTA, Nov. 13, 1996, at 1, 19 (former commerce undersecretary Garten pessimistic that US
will move ahead with FTAA during next four years).
4. Another critical foundational issue is the selection of the route or pathway to the
FTAA, especially in regards to the role that existing hemispheric trade agreements will have
in the FTAA process and the FTAA itself. See FTAA Working Groups Preparefor ViceMinisterial in Bogota, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2011 (Dec. 6, 1995) (OAS President
Gaviria describes the problem of choosing a path to the FTAA as the biggest challenge facing
Summit countries.). There are three primary options: NAFTA accession, convergence of
NAFTA and an expanded MERCOSUR, or negotiation of a new multilateral agreement. See
also Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements "-An Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade
Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 63, 67-68 & nn.16-22 (1996) (overview
of options) [hereinafter Garcia, Americas Agreements]; Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the
Creation of the FTAA, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995) (regarding certain issues attendant to
the NAFTA accession route). No one path has been widely acclaimed, and the issue is still
under active debate. Senior U.S. Official Warns 1997 is Critical Year for U.S. on Latin Trade,
INSIDE NAFTA, Nov. 13, 1996, at 1, 21 (Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Jeffrey Davidow cites United States as undecided on whether to favor multilateral negotiations or instead, to favor bloc to bloc negotiations); Senior Officials: U.S., Brazil At Odds On
Post-FlorianopolisFTAA Path, INSIDE NAFTA, Oct. 20, 1996, at 1, 2 (United States favors
multilateral approach while Brazil favors building block approach uniting existing blocs). It
may be that an interim stage in building the FTAA, similar to the European Union's association agreements program, could make the negotiation process more manageable. See Garcia,
Americas Agreements, supra at 69. In the meantime, absent a comprehensive FTAA plan,
countries are creating new bilateral and regional links. See Chile-Canada FTA Differs From
NAFTA, but Could Aid Chilean Accession, INSIDE NAFTA, Nov. 27, 1996, at 1,21 (bilateral
Chile-Canada FTA could speed Chile's NAFTA accession); MERCOSUR, Andean Group
Make Little Headway Towards South American FTA, INSIDE NAFTA, Nov. 27, 1996, at I
(negotiations towards a South American FTA); Chile, MERCOSUR Miss Deadline, INSIDE
NAFTA, Dec. 13, 1995, at I (MERCOSUR-Chile negotiating FTA).
5. Chief among the active RTAs include the Andean Common Market (ANCOM),
Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Basic Documents of International Economic Law 597 [hereinafter "B.D.I.E.L."] (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand
eds., 1990) [hereinafter The Treaty of Cartagena], consisting of Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia,
Ecuador and Peru; the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), created through an Annex to
the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, B.D.I.E.L. 660 [hereinafter
CARICOM Treaty], consisting of the English speaking countries of the Caribbean, and itself
part of the larger Caribbean Community created by the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean
Community, July 4, 1973, B.D.I.E.L. 647 [hereinafter Caribbean Community Treaty]; the
Central American Common Market (CACM), General Treaty on Central American Economic
Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, B.D.I.E.L. 529 [hereinafter Treaty of Managua], consisting of El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala; the Common Market of the
Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), Treaty Establishing A Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Treaty of Asunci6n], consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay; the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), The North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA], consisting
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governance mechanism, 6 and collectively representing a broad range of
views among the Summit countries as to the proper structure of trade
institutions.
While creation of a governing institutional mechanism for the FTAA
is clearly a legal task, the design and operation of trade governance
institutions raises a host of issues which can also be usefully studied
from the perspectives of the various other disciplines concerned with
international organizations (IOs) and international relations (IR). State
power must be transferred to, or at a minimum restrained in the face of,
treaty-based institutions; decision-making procedures involving some
form of voting or other indication of interest by states-parties must be
arranged; disputes among the states-parties must be resolved; and decisions must be implemented through national law or otherwise. These
functions involve the manipulation and exercise of state power in the
pursuit of state interest, and thus can be analyzed from the vantage point
of institutional economics 7 and political science, 8 as well as law. 9
This Article examines certain theoretical and structural issues to be
resolved in creation of the FTAA's governing institutions, and proposes
an outline for these institutions, drawing upon regime theory's analysis
of international organizations, the range of existing trade institutions
found among the hemisphere's RTAs, and indications of the Summit
countries' present goals and interests. The Article begins by summarizing Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal's concept of "mesoinstitutions,"
a new regime theory tool for identifying the roles played and benefits
conferred by 1Os in international relations. Parts I.B and I.C then apply
mesoinstitutions theory to the primary governance mechanisms of the
hemisphere's chief existing RTAs. 10 Part II then relies on the analysis of

of the United States, Canada and Mexico; and the "Group of Three" (G-3), G-3 Treaty, June
13,

1994, <http://www.sice.oas.orgtradeG3-E/G3E_TOC.stm>,

excerpted in 205

INTEGRACION LATINO-AMERICANA 41 (1994), consisting of Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia.
See also Garcia, Americas Agreements, supra note 4, at 71-78 & nn.31-80.
6. See infra notes 84-151 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., infra note 92; see generally Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and
the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional

Analysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. (No. 2/3, forthcoming 1997).
8. See, e.g., infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
9. In addition to its traditional legal-descriptive positivist approach, legal analysis of
institutions includes comparative approaches, see, e.g., Garcia, Americas Agreements, supra
note 4, as well as analogies drawn from other aspects of law, in particular domestic law. See,
e.g., Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996) (U.S. administrative law

analysis of standard of review for WTO dispute resolution panels).
10. This Article relies throughout for comparisons and illustrations on the structure of
existing RTA institutions in the hemisphere. As will be seen below, there is a considerable
range among these RTAs concerning the goals of the participant states, and the resulting
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mesoinstitutions theory in Parts LB and I.C to propose an institutional
framework for decisionmaking and dispute resolution in the FTAA.
From this analysis it appears that the primary theoretical issue to be
considered in structuring the FTAA's institutions is whether the FTAA
will be created merely to facilitate the parties' integration goals, or
actually empowered to produce substantive integration results in forms
such as new norms, dispute resolution decisions, and harmonization
legislation." This distinction is significant in particular because the latter
type of institution generally involves the transfer of state power to the
resulting institution, a significant "cost" to the states involved.' 2 The
Summit countries' stated goals for the FTAA suggest that they intend to
form a facilitative IO, 13 which has several implications for FTAA institutional design. 4 However, as their effort is subject to the overriding
aim that the resulting agreement be effective in accomplishing the
parties' goals, negotiation of the FTAA could involve creating certain
producing capabilities for FTAA institutions, despite the Summit countries' stated preference for facilitative trade agreements.
I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE

STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

International relations theory has been dominated in the post-war era
by political realism. Realist theory explains international relations solely
in terms of the individual power calculations of states operating in an

governance mechanisms, in particular with regard to their structure and the degree of trans-

ferred state power. Moreover, there is a clear disparity in terms of ambition between the goals
for the FTAA and the goals of several of the hemisphere's RTAs. Nevertheless, the disparity
in goals is not so great as to render comparative analysis impossible. See I INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 9 (Mauro Cappelletti et

al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter "INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW"] (the comparative enterprise
inevitably involves a dialectical tension between similarity and difference, and total identity

renders comparative analysis meaningless). Since the Summit countries are all members of
one or more hemispheric RTAs, a comparative study of existing trade governance mechanisms is quite relevant to the F'AA analysis. Moreover, if the FTAA is built out of some

form of convergence or linkage among existing RTAs, then the FTAA governance mechanism
will have to explicitly function in tandem with RTA governance mechanisms. If a separate

multilateral agreement is negotiated, then the FTAA governance mechanism will at least need
to take into account existing RTA governance mechanisms in terms of consistency and with
regard to the relationship or hierarchy among resulting hemispheric and regional norms,
systems, and decisions.
11. This distinction between organizations that facilitate and organizations that produce
is central to mesoinstitutions theory. See infra notes 31-76 and accompanying text.

12. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Section II.A.3.
14. See infra Section II.B (regarding the FTAA design).
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anarchic system. 15 On this view, international law serves only to justify
actions taken by nations in individual pursuit of national
interest, or to
16
object to such actions on the part of other states.
However, the realist account of international relations fails to explain both the persistence of law in post-war international relations and
the reality of cooperation among states through international institutions. 17 Put simply, states have been creating new international law in
record amounts, and entering into new institutional relationships at a
similar pace. 8 This apparent paradox is especially obvious in the area of
international economic law, where realism cannot explain the existence
and function of the international economic system, whose sine qua non
is cooperation. 9
Regime theory arose as a response to these perceived inadequacies
in the realist theory of international relations. 20 In the later post-war era,
Keohane and others developed regime theory to explain state cooperation and law creation. 2' Starting from an assumption of rationality
among state actors, 22 regime theorists posited that states recognized that

15. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectusfor
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 347 (anarchy, as view that power and
authority are decentralized, as basic ordering principle of realist view of international relations).
16. "The [Realist] challenge struck at the heart of the discipline, claiming that international law was but a collection of evanescent maxims or a 'repository of legal rationalizations'," Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory:
A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 205, 208 (citing Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of
Political Context to the Nature and Functioningof International Law: An Intermediate View,
in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 142 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley
Hoffmann eds., 1968)).
17. Slaughter Burley, supra note 16, at 218 (regime theorists' challenge to Realists was
to explain the continued existence and strength of international institutions despite decline in
American hegemony, which had been employed by Realists as such a justification.).
18. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529
(1993) (international community of states is increasingly interdependent and increasingly
manages itself through law); David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations:
Legal Personalityand the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 275-76 (1996)
(noting proliferation of international organizations).
19. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of
the World Trade Organization,44 DUKE L. J.829, 856 (1995).
20. Shell, supra note 19, at 859. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 16, at 209-20 (providing an overview of the history of the regime theory response).
21. Some of the major works in the field include: ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Stephen D.

Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36
INT'L ORG. 185 (1982); Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38
WORLD POL. 25 (1985). See generally Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie, International
Organization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986).
22. See Abbott, supra note 15, at 350 (discussing states' rationality as the assumption
that states "have consistently ordered preferences and choose among alternative courses of
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certain gains could be had from organizing their cooperative activity,23
and developed systems of norms, called regimes, through which to
structure their cooperative activities and realize these gains.24 Thus the
reality of cooperation could be explained as a rational strategy to maximize gains, and the persistence of international law could be explained
as expressing, indeed embodying, the set of norms, or rules, which made
cooperation manageable.25
But, as Kenneth Abbott puts it, "a funny thing happened on the way
to regime theory: formal international organizations came to be largely
neglected. 26 While regime theory has been significantly articulated on
the abstract "deductive" level, 27 regime theory analysis has not focused
extensively on the structure of actual international institutions and the
link between elements of structure and the function of regimes.28 Much
of the work done on actual institutions has been a continuation of the
legal descriptive tradition, reaching "inductive" conclusions about international organizations without the benefit of theory.29
Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal are currently addressing this gap
in regime theory analysis by examining what they have provisionally
termed "mesoinstitutions"-institutions positioned midway between fully

action so as to further those preferences"). In addition to rationality, IR theorists assume the
continued importance of anarchy, and the importance of the distribution of power among state
actors, in their analysis of state behavior, factors shared with Realism. Abbott, supra note 15,

at 344.
23. These gains include reduced transaction costs, creating conditions for orderly
negotiations, and improving the quality of information. See generally Slaughter Burley, supra
note 16, at 220 (chart summarizing functions and benefits of international regimes).
24. Stephen Krasner defines regimes as "sets of 'implicit or explicit principles, norms,

rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations." Krasner, supra note 21, at 186. It has been noted, however,
that this definition, while widely accepted, is not completely precise nor uniformly accepted.
See Abbott, supra note 15, at 338-39.
25. "[Regime theory] view[s] international norms as products of sophisticated selfinterest, the rational choices of states in a decentralized world." Abbott, supra note 15, at 340.
Cooperation is, of course, also possible even without formal rules, but formal rules have
certain advantages. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 16, at 220-21. Shell's Regime Management Model reflects Realist assumptions about power and self interest, and regime theory
analysis of problems of and gains from cooperation, and the role of lOs in securing cooperation gains. Shell, supra note 19, at 864-65.
26. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Mesoinstitutions: The Role of Formal
Organizations in International Politics 1 (July, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
authors: k-abbott@nwu.edu and snidal@chicago.edu) [hereinafter "Mesoinstitutions"].
27. For an introduction to the distinction between deductive versus inductive methodologies, see Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 5-7.
28. On the need for further work in this aspect of regime theory, see Peter Mayer et al.,
Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 417-18 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993).
29. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 6-7.
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decentralized anarchy and fully centralized statism-as an attempt to
identify the features of international institutions which enable them to
promote cooperative activity. 30 As this essay will utilize mesoinstitutions
theory in its exploration of FTAA institution-building, the theory is
introduced below.
A. "Mesoinstitutions:" Regime Theory and
Institutional Analysis
Abbott and Snidal attempt to explain why states rely on formal IOs
to enhance international cooperation. 3' In other words, they seek to
explain why states establish regimes through, or incorporating, formal
international organizations. In order to do so, Abbott and Snidal set out
a theory of 1Os as mesoinstitutions, or structures which facilitate "moderately" centralized cooperation through a variety of roles and functions.
Accepting the rationalist assumptions of regime theory, 32 Abbott and
Snidal situate mesoinstitutions as midway between the poles of decentralized anarchy and fully centralized statism which have dominated the
rhetoric of international relations. 33 This central dichotomy in IR analysis between anarchy and centralized order obscures the role and persistence of IOs. 34 Although mesoinstitutions engage in activities that are
also performed under conditions of anarchy or statism, mesoinstitutions
35
are distinguishable from actors at either end of the spectrum.
Mesoinstitutions embrace a range of intermediate activities between
decentralized cooperation and the centralized state model that states find
useful in achieving their goals. Abbott and Snidal distinguish activities

.30. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26. The manuscript has been submitted for review
by INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, and will undergo further revisions as part of that process.
Current information about the article can be obtained through e-mail addressed to:
kabbot@nwu.edu.
31. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 2. This question is thus a restatement of the
primary regime theory question, expressed in terms of organizations rather than "regimes."
See Slaughter Burley, supra note 16, at 218.
32. Thus distinguishing their effort from a parallel critique by the reflectivist school of
regime theory's failure to incorporate 1Os, see generally Kratchowil & Ruggie, supra note 21,
and echoing the work of Yarbrough and Yarbrough on trade institutions structure. BETH V.
YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH ix (1992) (explaining that

variety in international trade institutions reflects alternate governance structures employed to
organize and enforce agreements).
33. See Abbott, supra note 15, at 346-347; Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 7-8.
34. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 8.
35. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 3. Abbott and Snidal point out that 1Os are

neither "stalking horses for centralized cooperation" nor "ciphers for decentralized cooperation." Id.
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in this middle ground into two broad categories: facilitation and production.36 Through performing these two categories of activities, formal IOs
assume their unique operational and, to a lesser extent, enforcement
roles in international regimes.37
Facilitative activities, and the facilitative organizations that emphasize these activities, promote decentralized cooperation and render it
39
more effective. 38 Facilitative organizations reduce the transaction costs
of concluding mutually beneficial agreements, primarily through improving information and communication, and facilitate the self-enforcement
of these agreements in view of changing circumstances.4 °
Facilitative organizations promote decentralized cooperation principally through four related functions: the normative, the consultative, the
supportive, and the initiative functions. 1Os can perform a passive
normative function simply by embodying the rules which organize
cooperative behavior.4 The consultative function involves providing a
regular forum for state communication and interaction.4 2 Many 1Os also
take a more active supportive function, involving themselves in the
negotiation of agreements, 43 independently developing relevant information,' and staffing specialized committees and governing bodies to
advance the work of cooperation between major meetings of the membership. 45 Finally, some facilitative IOs play an even more active role in
36. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 10-11 and infra notes 38-75 and accompany-

ing text.
37. While lOs usually lack extensive coercive powers, nevertheless as will be seen below
1Os can play important enforcement roles. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
38. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 10. Facilitative organizations are distinguishable from the decentralized cooperation model in that these institutions play a tangible role in
promoting cooperation. See id.
39. See Abbott, supra note 15 at 398-99 (discussing the incorporation of the transaction
cost concept into international relations theory to articulate the benefits conferred by regimes).
40. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 10. This type of 10 has been the traditional
focus of regime theory. See id. at 12.
41. According to regime theory, norms are of value to states in that they clarify state
expectations, facilitate bargains through the linkage of issues, provide "rules of thumb" to
simplifying decision-making, and increase the political costs of certain behavior through
delegitimization. See id. at 13.
42. lOs as fora can reduce the transaction costs of state communication by creating state
expectations regarding regular opportunities for communication, offering a neutral or less
political locus for consultation and negotiation, focusing the agenda, and reducing uncertainty
and asymmetry of information. See id. at 14.
43. This may involve assistance in preparing the agenda, monitoring the status of
negotiations, and offering alternatives. See id. at 15. Abbott and Snidal offer the GATT
Secretariat during the Uruguay Round to illustrate this aspect of the supportive function. See
id.
44. Abbott and Snidal cite the OECD, for example, insofar as it actively seeks, compiles
and publishes information on issues relevant to the membership. See id. at 15-16.
45. Id.
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promoting cooperation by exercising a power of initiative-for example,
by calling a meeting of the membership, speaking publicly for the
membership on relevant issues in the international forum, or independently monitoring state compliance.46
Productive organizations, which emphasize the second category of
mesoinstitution activity, typically will perform a range of facilitating
functions as well.47 However, their distinctive nature lies in the fact that
they carry out substantive activities themselves, thus "producing" work
of importance to the regime: rules, technical assistance, information,
resolutions to disputes, legitimacy, and financial support, for example.48
As a function of this substantive role, producing organizations
generally enjoy a significant degree of independence from member
states, 49 and possess significant budgets, bureaucracies and expertise. 50 In
addition to its financial requirements, the "costs" of such an organization
include the degree of state power which must be ceded to a supranational entity in order for the organization to perform its producing functions
effectively."
Assuming the rationality of regime formation, the benefits of such
producing organizations must outweigh these considerable costs. Just as
private individuals form business firms, Abbott and Snidal assert that
states form producing IOs when they find that the transaction costs of
direct state-to-state cooperation, even with the help of facilitative IOs,
outweigh the costs of cooperating through a producing 10.52
Abbott and Snidal analyze the benefits of a producing organization
under two headings: efficiency and legitimacy. Producing lOs enhance
the efficiency of state cooperation through a variety of techniques,
including the pooling of information, resources, operations or risks;53 the

46. See id. at 17.
47. See id. at 12.
48. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 20. Abbott and Snidal cite the World Bank as

a prototypical producing organization, in that the Bank carries out an extensive range of
financial and development activities as an international financial institution with considerable
independence. See id.
49. See id.

50. See id. at 21.
51. See id. This aspect of mesoinstitutional analysis overlaps the institutional economics
analysis of the transfer of state power to institutions. See infra note 92. As power is arguably
the most valuable commodity in international political transactions, it is the single most
expensive, and hence most contentious and carefully scrutinized, aspect of regime formation
through mesoinstitutions. See Trachtman, supra note 7, at 27-29.
52. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 21.
53. Participating states obtain efficiencies by "pooling" information, operations, assets, or

risks in an 10 towards a substantive activity of interest. See id. For example, through the
World Bank, participating states are able to pool financial resources and risk, and achieve
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management of activities involving "joint production;, 54 and the production of "coordination points" in the form of rules, standards, and specifications which reduce the transaction costs of bargaining and joint activity through coordination efficiencies.55
In addition to these efficiency advantages, producing IOs enhance
cooperation through the legitimacy which their independence and neutrality can lend to international outcomes, and this makes 10 action
more effective than action taken directly by states.56 Abbott and Snidal
develop a list of 10 activities which enhance the legitimacy of outcomes, including "laundering," through which activities that might not
be acceptable on an interstate level become more acceptable when performed through an independent 10. 57 Other such activities turn on the
1O's neutrality, 5 such as when the 10 performs the roles of trustee,5 9

economies of scale and scope, resulting in more efficient and effective international lending
than any participating state could achieve on its own. See id. at 22-23.
54. As is the case with firms, producing IOs can be formed in order for participating
states to manage certain activities involving team work or "joint production." Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 24 (citing Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production.
Information Costs and Economic Organization,AM. ECON. REV. 62 (1972)). Joint production
processes can involve in the business setting the team effort of workers, managers, and other
groups, and internationally can involve efforts such as collective security (NATO) and
cooperative research (CERN). See id. at 25. Joint production presents special management
problems in monitoring, rewarding and disciplining individual members of the team, which
lOs, like firms, solve through hierarchical structure of bureaucrats as managers and states as
residual claimants. See id. at 24-25.
55. Citing the work of Thomas Schelling, Abbott and Snidal note that, while coordination points can be achieved through wholly decentralized cooperation, many problems in
international relations are of such complexity that the transactions costs of direct bargaining
are high. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 26. Where that is the case, 1Os can produce
coordination points at lower cost, in part through their pooling function. See id.
56. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 27. Slaughter Burley discusses regimes'
capacity to "legitimate and delegitimate different types of state action." Slaughter Burley,
supra note 16, at 219 (citing KEOHANE, supra note 21, at 244). The concept of legitimacy in
connection with governance is certainly not new, but it has only recently received attention in
connection with international institutions. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).

57. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 28. Of course, 10 action may not in fact be
purely independent, but laundering the activity nevertheless remains effective up to a point. If
the 10's policies come to be seen as responding to a particular state's interests, however, the
laundering benefit is compromised, a situation which Abbott and Snidal term "dirty laundering." Id. at 29.
58. While independence and neutrality are clearly linked, Abbott and Snidal suggest that
neutrality can be distinguished from independence, in that neutrality turns on the 10's position
as among individual member states (e.g., in disputes between them), while independence turns
on the 10's position vis-,-vis the member states as a whole. See id. at 32. "Neutrality adds
impartiality to independence." Correspondence from Kenneth Abbott (May 6, 1997).
59. Although rare, IOs can play a role similar to that of trustee or escrow agent in
domestic private law, holding assets on behalf of another or as an intermediary in specialized
situations. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 31. For example, Abbott and Snidal cite the
role of the UN Compensation Commission created by the UN Security Council at the end of
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allocator 6° and information source. 6 ' Finally, 1Os can occasionally serve
as "community representatives" to advance fundamental community
interests with a unique degree of legitimacy.62
One of the most important legitimacy functions that turns on an IO's
neutrality is its role as arbiter in the resolution of international disputes. 3 Facilitative organizations can play a dispute resolution role
through their consultative, supportive and initiative roles, reducing the
transactions costs of inter-state negotiation and improving the quality
and availability of information. 64 Producing organizations, in addition to
performing these roles, can go farther and provide authoritative dispute
resolution services, typically through binding arbitration.6 5 Such intervention assists the 10 participants through interpretation of treaty commitments and the clarification of rights and obligations.6 6
Besides increasing the legitimacy of outcomes, the role of arbiter is
one way that 1Os play a key role in the enforcement of international
agreements, despite their lack of any formal coercive capability. Abbott
and Snidal cite the emphasis on coercion as one of the factors in IR
analysis which masks the contributions which 1Os make to international
cooperation.67 A mesoinstitutions analysis reveals that both facilitative
and producing 1Os play a substantial role in enforcement through their
facilitative and producing capabilities, and in certain cases have a direct
enforcement role as well.
Facilitative 1Os contribute to the decentralized enforcement of
agreements by generating information, providing a forum which supports continued communication through disputes and generalizes the

the Gulf War to act as trustee for claimants against Iraq's assets in the Compensation Fund.

See id.
60. Many 1Os are relied upon to allocate scarce resources among several claimants, as is
the case with the World Bank's allocation of financial resources. See id. at 34.
61. 1Os go beyond the facilitative pooling of information when they independently

confirm state information, enhancing its credibility according to their own perceived neutrality. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 35.

62. Abbott and Snidal cite the UN as a classic example of a community representative
institution, with its broad representation, its lofty goals on behalf of the "United Nations," its

mandate to consider almost any aspect of international relations, and its power to formulate
and express the norms and aspirations of its community. See id. at 40-43.
63. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 36-40.

64. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 37; see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying
text; see also Abbott, supra note 15, at 367 (regime contributions to cooperation and problem

solving). Such activities can include traditional dispute resolution mechanisms of good offices,
mediation, conciliation and fact-finding. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 37.
65. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 37; Shell, supra note 19, at 865 (binding
enforcement necessary for regime management).
66. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 37.
67. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 46.
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reputation effects of noncompliance, offering limited dispute resolution
services, 68 and serving as a setting for modification of existing agreements in response to compliance issues.69
Producing 1Os can take a more active role than facilitating lOs,
providing indirect enforcement not only by producing neutral findings of
fact and law as arbiters, but also by legitimating retaliation by participants, directly monitoring state behavior, and mobilizing their base of
support within the polities of the participant states to ensure state compliance." Finally, certain producing IOs have limited direct enforcement
powers, such as the requirement of national reporting, which may involve the power to issue resolutions criticizing participant behavior;7 1
the withholding of 10 benefits, 72 including membership in the 10 itself;7 3
and in a very few cases, the power to directly sanction a state economically or militarily.74
In summary, Abbott and Snidal suggest that a mesoinstitutions
perspective on 1Os can improve regime theory's analysis of 1Os in two
ways: first, by demonstrating that 1Os often play a more active and
independent role in international cooperation than regime theory has
suggested to date; and second, that these roles generally require higher
levels of centralization and organization than regime theory by itself
accounts for.75 Mesoinstitutions analysis suggests how, in particular, IOs
repay states for the costs of organization through the benefits which
facilitating and producing activities contribute to states' efforts at international cooperation.

68. Facilitative 1Os can offer fact-finding, mediation, and good offices services through
their supportive and initiative functions. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 47. See infra

notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
69. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 47.
70. See id. Mobilization by environmental and human rights lOs of their domestic
constituencies are examples of the latter function. See id. at 47-48.
71. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 48-49. Abbott and Snidal cite the ILO's
findings regarding labor practices of participant states as an example of this type of direct
enforcement. See id.
72. Abbott and Snidal cite IMF conditionality as a classic example of this type of direct
enforcement. Id. at 49. Such "tit-for-tat" conditional cooperation can be a key to decentralized
cooperative activity. See Abbott, supra note 15, at 365-66.
73. This technique is as powerful as its exercise is rare. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note
26, at 49.
74. Abbott and Snidal refer to the UN Security Council's authority to directly impose
sanctions and, in principle, directly deploy troops through Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See
id. at 50. As the latter has not occurred, Abbott and Snidal characterize the UN as shifting to
indirect enforcement through the authorization of participant action in appropriate cases. See
id. at 51.
75. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 18.
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Mesoinstitutions analysis may also aid in identifying the key operating characteristics of IOs and why particular lOs take the form they do.
The following subsection attempts to draw some implications of
mesoinstitutions analysis for one particular feature of trade institutions,
their governance mechanisms.
B. Mesoinstitutions and Trade Governance
The rationality assumption underlying regime theory dictates that
states will, when acting rationally in a functioning information market,
design the 10 that best suits their goals and needs with regard to a
particular issue area. This perspective precludes any normative argument
that a certain type or level of 10 is "better" than any other.7 6 One is
limited to a more functionalist analysis, identifying which type of 1O or
aspect of an 1O's structure may be best suited to a specific goal.
This Article focuses on one particular feature of international organization design, the IO's governance mechanisms or institutions. "Governance" is here understood to mean that critical subcategory of 10 activity
involving the making of decisions and the resolution of disputes.77 The
governance corollary of IR theory's rationality assumption is that, all
other things being equal,78 states will establish governance mechanisms
best suited to the goals and functions envisioned for the 10 in general.
Analysis of governance design from a regime theory perspective therefore
involves an investigation into both the pertinent goals of the participating
states for the 10 in question and the range of governance mechanisms
available from which to draw. Such analysis aims to identify the extent
to which a particular governance mechanism is or may be suitable to
accomplish the governance and substantive tasks of a particular 10.
The mesoinstitutions theory of IOs suggests several pertinent questions to guide the analysis of 10 governance mechanisms. First, it must
be determined whether, broadly speaking, the institution is intended to

76. See Abbott, supra note 15, at 338 n.17 ("Neither 'principles' nor 'norms' necessarily

implies a moral element; the principles of a regime can simply be taken to define its purposes.
[citation omitted]. Regimes, then, are not necessarily 'good', though they are often discussed
as if they were."). This approach, and the approach taken in this Article, may be distinguished
from other analyses of trade governance, such as that by Robert Housmann which is critical
of contemporary trade governance models from a participatory democracy perspective. See
generally Robert F. Housmann, Democratizing International Trade Decision-making, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994).
77. Thus distinguishing this range of activities from other 10 activities such as the creation
of relevant information or the provision of technical assistance.
78. For example, assuming the negotiation process has been effective in reaching
consensus on key points and the states' parties have adequate information and are effectively
advised by their legal, political and economic experts.
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play a facilitative or producing role. These two roles presage very
different expectations on the part of states-parties with regard to the sorts
of decisions and disputes the 10 will involve itself in and the level to
which it will be involved. Second, if the 10 is to be facilitative, then it
must be determined which of the facilitative roles the 10 will be constituted to play, as this will determine the range of issues and depth of
involvement with which the governance mechanisms must contend. Third,
if the 1O is intended to be a producing one, then beyond the facilitation
questions the states will need to determine the extent of state power to be
transferred and the distribution of this power into effective governance
mechanisms.
The following section will develop these issues with reference to
existing hemispheric RTAs, as an application and elaboration of
mesoinstitutions theory and as a prelude to an examination of these issues
in the context of future FTAA institutions. The section proceeds in two
sub-sections: decision-making mechanisms and dispute resolution mechanisms. The attempt is made to discuss first facilitative, then producing
institutions, although since actual 1Os often perform both facilitating and
producing roles, it is difficult to segregate IOs themselves neatly into
producing versus facilitative categories.79
1. Decisionmaking
If an 10 is intended to be facilitative, then the main question in
designing a governance mechanism involves which of the range of
facilitative functions the participants intend the 10 to serve.80 A simple 10
largely serving a passive normative role may have very little in the way
of decision-making or dispute resolution mechanisms. 81 However, to the
extent such an 10 makes any attempt to facilitate decisions by the
participants over basic questions of regime direction and maintenance,
such as providing for occasional "joint action," such an 10 has established a governance mechanism.

79. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 10.

80. Facilitation can involve normative, consultative, supportive and initiative roles. See
supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
81. Abbott and Snidal recognize that the states which are parties to a simple normative
regime may not have created an international organization at all, but simply concluded an

international agreement. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 13 ("At the extreme, however,
[the normative] function can be performed without any organizational structure at all, by a
treaty or even a less formally expressed set of norms."). In that case, "governance" issues
would be resolved according to treaty provisions on amendment, modification, renegotiation,
etc., or by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention, infra note 216.

82. The pre-WTO GATT is a good example of such an 10. Stripped of all its institutional
trappings by the unique politics of its birth, the GATT nevertheless provided in Article XXV
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Consultative and supportive 1Os will need a mechanism through
which the participants can, among other things, call and support meetings,
develop information, and manage any secretariat or other institutional
apparatus needed to perform their functions. For example, NAFTA and
the G-3,83 both arguably drafted along facilitative lines,84 have decisionmaking mechanisms that consist principally of one governing body-the
Commission-composed of cabinet-level ministers from the governments
of each party." Each Commission in both systems is charged with rather
general duties: to supervise the treaty's implementation, oversee its
further elaboration, resolve disputes in its interpretation or application,
supervise the work of committees and working groups, and consider any
other matter relevant to operation of the treaty. 86 In carrying out these
duties, the NAFTA and G-3 Commissions are relatively weak, functioning
principally in a consultative role as a forum for regular ministerial
meetings, with representatives under instruction from their home governments. Each Commission is also empowered to play a supportive role,
consisting chiefly of the power to establish and oversee a Secretariat 7 and

a minimalist mechanism for "joint" action of by the Contracting Parties for necessary regime
maintenance activities. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 126-28
(1969). In the case of GATT, supportive services were provided through the arrangement to
"rent" a Secretariat from the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization, or
ICITO. See id. at 49-50, 145-46.
83. The G-3 FTA agreement strongly resembles NAFTA. 10 BNA-ITR 2053, Dec. 8, 1993
(Anticipating that the Treaty could serve as the basis for accession to NAFFA as a bloc in the
near future, the G-3 nations quite self-consciously drew on NAFrA as a model.).
84. The limited market-access goals of the NAFTA countries and the structure of NAFTA
institutions suggest that NAFTA is intended principally to be a facilitative organization. Its
primary goal appears to be normative, to embody tariff-reduction and other substantive trade
commitments of the parties. Its institutions are not empowered to independently produce new
norms or binding decisions, or produce new standards or "coordination points" in harmonization areas, nor even to have a power of initiative. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
Rather, the Commission is constituted to play a simple consultative role, and with the
Secretariat offering modest support to the participants. As with the NAFTA, the G-3 Treaty's
stated objectives and decision-making structure suggest that the G-3 was intended to serve a
facilitative role. Like NAFTA, it embodies normative commitments but does not establish an
institutional capacity to produce new norms. See id.
85. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2001. The NAFTA side agreements create their own
Commissions as well, consisting of a Secretariat and a Council composed of the relevant
cabinet-level ministers. Their role is strictly limited by the scope of the side agreements, but
within their competence they function veiy much like the NAFTA Commission. The primary
governance body of the G-3 Treaty is also called the Commission, consisting of representatives
of the Parties' trade or economic ministries. G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 2001.
86. NAFMA, supra note 5, art. 2001.2. G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 2001.2.
87. The NAFI'A Secretariat is charged with the duty to "provide assistance to the
Commission," as well as to chapter 19 and 20 dispute resolution panels and to other groups
under the Treaty as directed by the Commission. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2002.3. Instead
of a Secretariat, the G-3 treaty directs that each Party designate within their trade or economic
ministries a section which, in concert with other designated sections, will function much as a
secretariat under the oversight of the Commission. G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 2002.
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ad hoc committees or working groups, to seek the advice of NGOs or
individuals, and to take any other action agreed to by the parties.8
If the participants intend their 10 to have a power of initiative, then
the demands on decision-making mechanisms will be correspondingly
higher. The G-3 parties gave its Commission a power of initiative, thus
distinguishing it from the more passive NAFTA Commission. The G-3
Commission is not only authorized to oversee the Treaty's elaboration,
but is also specifically charged with: evaluating the results achieved under
the Treaty and recommending to the Parties any modifications it deems
advisable; suggesting to the Parties the measures necessary to implement
the decisions of the Parties; and establishing policies regarding sectoral
prices.89
As both NAFTA and the G-3 are principally facilitative 1Os,
mesoinstitutions theory suggests that one would not expect to find
appreciable degrees of state power transferred to the NAFTA and G-3
decision-making organs, and indeed that is the case. Neither the NAFTA
nor the G-3 Commissions are expressly authorized to establish new norms
for their respective treaties through their decisions. Moreover, the independent authority of both Commissions is quite limited, as decisions are
to be taken only by the consensus of the Parties.'
In contrast, if states intend to create an 10 that can play a producing
role, then the fundamental question becomes the degree of state power
which the participants are willing to transfer to the 10 to enable it to
carry out its producing roles, which will have a critical impact on the
nature of the governance mechanism. Students of integration institutions
distinguish among institutions on a continuum according to the degree to
which they are "positive," transferring state power to a central authority,
or "negative," committing member states merely to refrain from certain
actions. 9' In this sense, the decision to create a producing 10 involves, at
some level, a commitment to positive integration.

88. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2001.3; G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 20-01.3.
89. G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 20-01.2. Since the G-3 Commission must still function
by consensus and has the power merely to recommend, this power of initiative is not really a
producing capacity and, as an enforcement mechanism, is not likely to reach any results or
make recommendations against the substantive interests of any of the G-3 parties. There may,

however, be a certain "laundering" value akin to that of producing organizations in having the
Commission make these reports and recommendations rather than the G-3 parties directly. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
90. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2001.4. G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 20-01.4. It is not
even clearly stated that the decisions of the NAFTA Commission are to be binding on the

Parties, as is made clear in other treaties. For example, the G-3 Treaty states explicitly that
Commission decisions are binding. Id.

91. See, e.g., Jacques Pelkmans, The Institutional Economics of European Integration, in
INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 318, 321. The mesoinstitutional analysis of

producing lOs thus intersects with this institutional economics perspective.

Winter 1997]

An Essay in Trade Governance

If participants creating a producing 10 have accepted in principle
that some state power will be transferred, then subsequent questions
involve how much power will be transferred and how this transfer will
be embodied in the structure of the institution. It is here that many of
the issues raised in the legal descriptive tradition of 10 analysis find
their place, such as the issues of state representation and voting procedures in decision-making processes, 92thwhether the 10 is empowered to
create new norms for the regime,93 and, if so, how such norms will be
implemented within the regime and within the law of the participants. 94
Much of this analysis consists of describing the range of options for
achieving an optimum or desired balance between 10 effectiveness and
state authority. 95
In the Western hemisphere, the four remaining principal RTAs (MERCOSUR, CACM, ANCOM and CARICOM) present significantly different
approaches to decisionmaking within a producing trade organization.96 All
four have in common that, in contrast to NAFTA and the G-3, they
establish or intend to establish deeper levels of integration in the form of
a customs union or common market rather than an FTA.97 All four also

92. Options include consensus, majority or supermajority voting, and representatives
acting independently or under instruction. See, e.g., infra notes 100-01 and 107 (regarding
MERCOSUR representation and voting). See generally Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 566 (1980) for an excellent analysis of
voting in international organizations from a strictly functionalist viewpoint.
93. See, e.g., infra notes 117-20 (regarding ANCOM organs and norm-creation).
94. See, e.g., infra note 120 (regarding the direct effect of ANCOM norms).
95. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 19; Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
96. CARICOM presents a special case, in that it appears to function in a facilitating role
despite its structural similarities to its producing CM and CU brethren. See infra notes 121-26
and accompanying text.
97. The MERCOSUR Treaty is a comprehensive agreement providing for the free
movement of goods, services, labor and capital. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 5, arts. 1,5. The
Treaty of Managua requires elimination of internal tariffs on the vast majority of goods and
commodities. Treaty of Managua, supra note 5, art. 3. The CET establishing the customs union
set high external tariffs, in line with the import substitution philosophy underlying this and
other RTAs of the first generation. See JOSEPH GRUNWALD ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND US POLICY 47 (1972). The Treaty of Cartagena aimed to
establish both an FTA and a CU. The Treaty of Cartagena, supra note 5, art. 3. The Treaty
originally established a system of automatic, irrevocable tariff reductions, reminiscent of the
ill-fated LAFTA scheme, aimed at the creation of an FTA by 1980, which also failed. See G.
POPE ATKINS, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 186 (3d ed. 1995).

The Treaty's plan to establish a CET also failed. Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration
and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARv. INT'L L.J.
127, 142 (1995). ANCOM members agreed in 1990 to make a final push to eliminate internal
tariffs by 1992. GARY C. HUFBAUER AND JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 113 (1994). One result from that agreement was the 1992 FTA
between Colombia and Venezuela, which may in turn serve as a contact point for further
regional expansion. See Dr. Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements in the Western
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establish some form of two-tier decision-making mechanism 98 empowered
to produce rules of varying authority for their systems, but here the
similarities end.
The decision-making mechanism established by the MERCOSUR
Treaty plays the facilitative roles of consultation, support and initiation.
In MERCOSUR, the principal organs fulfilling the governance role
played in NAFTA and the G-3 by the Commission are the Council99 and
the Common Market Group.'O° Under Article 9 of the MERCOSUR
Treaty, the Council and the Common Market Group are jointly charged
with administering and interpreting the Treaty of Asunci6n. The Council
is the primary consultative body of the MERCOSUR system. ° ' The
Common Market Group, designated in Article 13 as the executive organ
of the Treaty, plays a supportive role in tandem with the MERCOSUR
Secretariat, 0 2 and has been granted a power of initiative regarding
measures to be debated and decided by the Council, as well as for
monitoring compliance, enforcing decisions, and drawing up work
programs and working groups regarding Treaty goals.10 3 However, the
Council and Common Market Group are empowered to go beyond
facilitation and produce decisions on new norms for the Treaty that are

Hemisphere, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 683, 704 (1993); Negotiating an FTA with Chile,
11 BNA-ITR 111, Jan. 19, 1994. Late in 1994 the ANCOM countries also agreed to establish
a CET, which went into effect February 1, 1995. Andean Pact Nations and Mercosur to Begin
Free Trade Negotiations, 121 BNA-ITR 269, Feb. 8, 1995.
98. Decision-making mechanisms fall into two broad categories: single-tier systems, and
two-tier systems. A single tier system establishes a single organ in which decisions are made

and, if appropriate, from which norms issue. A two-tier system consists of two interrelated
organs which together take decisions and issue norms or legislation.
99. The Council consists of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers for the
Economy of each MERCOSUR state. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 5, art. 11.
100. The Common Market Group consists of four members from each State, representing
the ministries of foreign affairs and the economy, and the Central Bank, and is coordinated by
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. See id. arts. 13, 14. In addition to the Council and the CMG,
the Treaty of Asunci6n also established a Joint Parliamentary Commission to facilitate
implementation of MERCOSUR norms in national law. Id. art. 24. The basic institutional
structure that established the Treaty of Asunci6n was confirmed and elaborated, pursuant to
Article 18 of the Treaty of Asunci6n, by the Protocol of Ouro Preto, signed on December 17,
1994. Protocolo Adicional al Tratado de Asunci6n sobre la Estructura Institucional del
Mercosur-Protocolo de Ouro Preto [Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunci6n on the
Institutional Structure of Mercosur-The Protocol of Ouro Preto] Dec. 17, 1994 [hereinafter
Protocol of Ouro Preto](on file with author). The Protocol of Ouro Preto created a new body,
the Trade Commission, which assists the Common Market Group in implementing and
developing MERCOSUR's common trade policy. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra, arts. 16-21.
101. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 100, art. 3.
102. Under Article 14.XIII of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, the Common Market Group
supervises the work of the Secretariat, established by Articles 33 et seq. of the Protocol of Ouro
Preto to support the work of the MERCOSUR organs. See id. arts. 14,33.
103. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 5, art. 13.
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binding on the parties.'" The Council in particular is uniquely charged
with political leadership and decision-making power to ensure the establishment of a Common Market.I°5 However, while designing these organs
to play a producing role, the parties have carefully limited the amount of
state power transferred, and have established a requirement that decisions
be made by consensus.'0 6
As with MERCOSUR, CACM participants have established an
institution which plays both facilitative and producing roles. The CACM
treaty establishes a relatively lean institutional arrangement, consisting of
the Central American Economic Council (CAEC) 10 7 and the Executive
Council (EC)."°8 The CAEC is charged with directing integration and
coordinating the economic policies of the member states, and is the
treaty's primary consultative forum.' 0 9 The Executive Council (EC)
actually applies and administers the Treaty and has a power of initiation,11 ° although its executive duties are to a certain extent shared by the
Permanent Secretariat, which has responsibilities exceeding a strictly
supportive role.' Although the EC and CAEC are authorized to produce
decisions by majority vote, thus embodying in principle a significant

104. The decisions of the Council and the resolutions of the Common Market Group are
binding on the parties to the Treaty. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 100, arts. 9,15.
Moreover, the parties commit to take all necessary steps to ensure compliance in their domestic
jurisdictions with the norms emanating from the Treaty's decision-making organs. Id. art. 38.
105. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 5, art. 10; Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 100,
art. 3.
106. The MERCOSUR Council and the Common Market Group are not fully supranational
in character, as the representatives on each are under instruction from their home government
and controlled through national ministries of foreign affairs or the economy. See supra notes
100-01. Although similar to the European Community in terms of goals, MERCOSUR thus
lacks the EC's powerful supranational institutions. See Thomas A. O'Keefe, An Analysis of the
Mercosur Economic Integration Project from a Legal Perspective, 28 INT'L LAW. 439, 439,
444 (1994); Marta Haines-Ferrari, Mercosur: A New Model of Latin American Economic
Integration?, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 423-4, 448 (1993). By contrast, the ANCOM
executive body, the Junta or Board, is expressly charged with acting in the interests of the
regional integration effort, and not under instruction from any home governments, thus
resembling more closely the Commission of the European Community. See infra note 120.
Moreover, Article 37 specifies action by consensus for all MERCOSUR organs. Protocol of
Ouro Preto, supra note 100, art. 37.
107. The CAEC is comprised of the Ministers of the Economy of the member states.
Treaty of Managua, supra note 5, art. 20.
108. The EC consists of one principal member and one alternate from each contracting
state. Id. art. 21.

109. Id. art. 20.
110. The Executive Council was formed for the purpose of applying and administering the
Treaty. Id. art. 21. The Executive Council has authority to take measures to promote integration, including the proposal of other agreements. Id. art. 22.
111. The Permanent Secretariat, established in Article 23, is also charged with ensuring
"the proper application ... of [the] Treaty", id. art. 24, and is authorized to convene the
Executive Council. Id. art. 21.
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transfer of state power beyond that permitted by the MERCOSUR
participants,112 the Treaty of Managua does not expressly state that CAEC
or EC decisions bind the participants,"1 3 thereby possibly undercutting the
appearance of supranationality.
The ANCOM institutions were constituted to serve both facilitative
and producing roles, and given perhaps the most extensive state
power-at least on paper-with which to perform the latter functions.
ANCOM's principle governance bodies are the Commission, which serves
as the principal consultative forum for the ANCOM countries," 4 and the
Board or Junta." 5 In addition to its supportive roles, the Commission has
a broad producing mandate, with "exclusive legislative capacity as to
matters within its competence."'" 6 Under Article 7, the Commission is
charged with establishing general policies for the Common Market,
approving the standards for harmonization of the economic policies of the
members," 7 and taking decisions regarding the proposals of the Board. It
is also empowered to appoint Board members, to provide instructions to
the Board, and even to delegate its functions to the Board when appropriate.118 The ANCOM organs are authorized to produce new norms and

112. Executive Council resolutions are adopted by majority vote. Treaty of Managua,
supra note 5, art. 21. Before ruling on any matter, the CAEC must first decide whether for that
issue it will proceed by a unanimous or majority vote. Id. However, it must decide this
unanimously. Id.
113. In contrast to the MERCOSUR Protocol of Ouro Preto, the Treaty of Managua is
silent as to the binding or nonbinding status of decisions made by the CAEC or EC, and does
not provide for their legal effect in the domestic law of CACM members, or even commit the
CACM parties to their best efforts at domestic compliance.
114. The ANCOM Commission, consisting of one representative from each member's
government, is the highest body within the ANCOM institutional framework. Treaty of
Cartagena, supra note 5, art. 6.
115. Id. art. 5. The Board is the "technical" body of ANCOM. Id. art. 13. In 1979 the
ANCOM countries established an Andean Parliament, an advisory body with no direct
legislative role or capacity. Treaty Establishing the Andean Parliament, 19 I.L.M 269 (1980).
116. Treaty of Cartagena, supra note 5, art. 6.
117. The ANCOM organs have been active in attempting to increase efficiency through
the production of coordination points, though with mixed results. The common market was to
be supported on a national level by a vigorous program of harmonization, especially in the
areas of foreign capital and technology transfer rules, where the ANCOM countries adopted an
aggressive stance towards foreign investment and in general tried to limit the force of MNEs
in ANCOM territory. This approach, as symbolized by a key measure, Decision 24 restricting
foreign investment, ultimately failed, but not until Chile had left ANCOM, RTA discipline
among members had collapsed over widespread national derogations from this approach, and
overall levels of foreign investment had decreased substantially. See Kenneth W. Abbott &
Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: "A Work in Progress", 14 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 493, 501 (1994).
118. Treaty of Cartagena, supra note 5, art. 7.
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interpret the treaty, often by majority vote, 19 and with results directly
applicable in the jurisdictions of participants.120
Within the hemisphere's customs union or common market RTAs,
CARICOM appears as something of an anomaly. Although it establishes
a common market' and empowers a facilitative and a producing organization, the CARICOM Treaty itself establishes only a single governance
mechanism as the "principal organ" of CARICOM, the Common Market
Council.12 2 However, the Council works in tandem with another institution, the Conference of Heads of Government, created by the Caribbean
Community Treaty as the decisional body for the Community. 12' Together, both institutions operate as a two-tier governance structure for
CARICOM; while each institution plays a primary role in its area of
competence, the Council is still subject to the general authority of the
Conference. 124 The Conference plays the principal consultative role, while
the Council exercises a supportive role with the Secretariat, and has the

119. Under Article I1 of the Treaty of Cartagena, the Commission may generally act by
2/3 majority. Treaty of Cartagena, supra note 5, art. 11. Most importantly, while the decisions
of the Board must be unanimous, the Board is charged with acting solely for the interests of
the subregion as a whole, and shall not seek nor accept instructions from any government or
other group. Id. arts. 14, 17.
120. The decisions of the Commission now have direct applicability in the member
countries. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1979, art.
3, 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979) [hereinafter "Andean Court of Justice Treaty"]. This resolves in
principle a major gap in the earlier legislative process of the Cartagena Agreement. See Scott
Horton, Peru and ANCOM: A Study in the Disintegrationof a Common Market, 17 TEX. INT'L
L. J. 39, 43-44 (1982). The fact that ANCOM has in reality fared so poorly suggests that in
fact the ANCOM institutions were designed with powers that exceeded the actual goals of the
participants for the institution, regardless of the formal objectives stated in the treaty.
121. The Treaty Annex establishing CARICOM sets forth the basic provisions necessary
to create an FTA and to move progressively towards a customs union and common market.
Caricom Treaty, supra note 5, chs. III to V. The CET is largely in place, but progress has been
slow, with several missed timetables. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 97, at 124-25.
Economic integration through CARICOM's common market is on of three principal objectives
of the Caribbean Community, which also aims for regional cooperation in infrastructure and
basic services projects including health, education, information and broadcasting; and coordination of foreign policy. Caribbean Community Treaty, supra note 5, art. 4.
122. CARICOM Treaty, supra note 5, art. 5. The council is composed of one minister of
government from each member state. Id. art. 6.
123. The Conference consists of the heads of state of the treaty signatories. CARICOM
Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 6, 12.
124. The Conference has final authority over matters affecting the Community, and
resolves disputes concerning interpretation and application of the Community Treaty except
with regard to CARICOM matters. Caribbean Community Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 8, 19. The
Council is responsible for the operation and development of CARICOM, and resolves disputes
concerning the CARICOM agreement. CARICOM Treaty, supra note 5, art. 7. However, even
in decisional matters affecting CARICOM the Council is still subject to the general authority
of the Conference, since CARICOM matters come with the overall objectives of the Caribbean
Community. CARICOM Treaty, supra note 5, art. 5; Caribbean Community Treaty, supra note
5, art. 8.3.
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power of initiative. 2 ' Both treaties authorize their respective organs to
produce decisions that bind the member state addressed. However, the
fact that only the Council may proceed by a majority vote, and only in
126
certain cases, undercuts the supranational reach of these provisions.
2. Dispute Resolution
The dispute resolution and enforcement role that 10 participants
contemplate for their institutions requires independent consideration,
because, by definition, the role will have a significant influence on the
design of the governance mechanism. As with the design of decisionmaking mechanisms, dispute resolution and enforcement also hinge on the
basic decision between facilitation or production. For example, if the 10
is intended to offer arbitration services involving the production of a
binding decision, then particular questions involving the appointment of
panelists, the scope of inquiry, and the binding effect of panel decisions
will need to be addressed, raising again the question of state power. If the
dispute resolution function will be confined simply to facilitation involving mediation or consultation, or even an arbitral procedure leading to
something less than a binding decision, then less formal mechanisms
involving little or no transfer of state power may be suitable.
While the majority of the hemisphere's RTAs follow arbitration-style
dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs), these systems differ in important
respects. NAFTA's primary DSM, found in Chapter 20 of the Treaty,
involves consultation, Commission intervention and international arbitration.'27 However, the NAFTA Commission's role has been characterized
as that of a "political troubleshooting institution rather than as an inde-

125. Article 15 of the Caribbean Commonity Treaty establishes a Secretariat. Caribbean
Community Treaty, supra note 5, art. 15. Article 7 of the CARICOM Treaty authorizes the
Council to make proposals to the Conference towards the development of the Common Market
and for entering into other treaties. Caricom Treaty, supra note 5, art. 7.
126. Article 9 of the Caribbean Community Treaty, supra note 5, and Article 8 of the
CARICOM Treaty, supra note 5, establish the power for binding decisions in their respective
organs. Moreover, Article 5 of the Caribbean Community Treaty, supra note 5, and Article 4
of the CARICOM Treaty, supra note 5, obligate members to take all appropriate measures to
ensure compliance with the decisions of their respective organs, at least with respect to the
Common Market (the text is unclear as to Community decisions outside the Common Market).
However, the Conference must act by unanimity, as must the Council in most cases. Caribbean
Community Treaty, supra note 5, art. 9; CARICOM Treaty, supra note 5, art. 8.
127. NAFTA's principal DSM is set forth in Articles 2003-2019 of the treaty. See James
R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the
Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531, 560-65 (1993); Jeffrey P. Bialos &
Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model,
27 INT'L LAW. 603 (1993).
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pendent arbitral body" 128 largely because the final reports of the arbitral
panels are not binding and are not supranational in this sense. 29 Thus,
despite the appearance of a producing role, the NAFTA DSM actually
plays a facilitative role, supporting the resolution of disputes among
NAFTA parties through the development of recommendations and options
for agreement, but falling short of authoritatively resolving the dispute. 3 '
CARICOM's DSM resembles that of NAFTA in key respects. If the
parties fail to settle their dispute, they may refer the matter to the Council, which may in turn convene an arbitral tribunal. 13' At the conclusion
of a Council or tribunal proceeding, the Council makes recommendations
that are not binding on the parties to the dispute. 132 If a party fails to
implement the recommendations, however, the Council may authorize
sanctions. 3 3 In its resemblance to NAFTA's DSM, the CARICOM DSM
reveals a similar decision on the behalf of its parties that the resolution
of their disputes should ultimately remain in their direct control.
The G-3, MERCOSUR, CACM and ANCOM treaties all go beyond
NAFTA and CARICOM's facilitative models and establish DSMs with
a producing capability. The G-3 and, MERCOSUR follow a binding
arbitration model, while the CACM and ANCOM establish quasi-judicial
or judicial procedures.
As is the case with NAFTA, the G-3 Treaty gives the parties the
option of pursuing the WTO dispute resolution process134 or the Treaty's

128. David S. Huntington, Settling 'Disputes under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 407, 416 (1993).

129. Article 2018 requires that the parties "shall agree on a resolution of the dispute" upon
receipt of the final report, "which normally shall conform with the determinations and
recommendations of the panel" (emphasis supplied). NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2018. See also
NAFTA Dispute Settlement Flawed by Politics, Canadian Official Said, 12 BNA-ITR 1774, Oct.

25, 1995 (final outcome of DSM involves political decision regarding implementation of
arbitral decisions).
130. Nevertheless, if the parties fail to reach an agreement, they may face a loss of treaty
benefits. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2019. NAFTA's overall dispute settlement system does
contain one true supranational element, however. The decisions of the trilateral panel review
process of Chapter 19 will subject national agency antidumping and countervailing duty
decisions to international review and remand, as appropriate. NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 19.
This suggests that in the highly contentious area of dumping determinations, the parties (US
and Canada in this case) decided that the costs of further decentralized activity outweighed the
costs of creating a more centralized, producing organization for this issue, perhaps in part due
to the legitimizing effect of institutional decisions.
131. Caribbean Community Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11 annex. The Council must convene
an arbitral tribunal a the request of a party to the dispute. Id.
132. Id. art. 11.3.
133. Id. art. 11.4.
134. This option is contained in Article 19-03 of the G-3 Treaty, G-3 Treaty, supra note
5, art. 19-03, and Article 2005 of the NAFTA Treaty. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2005. The
WTO dispute resolution mechanism is found in the WTO Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. See WTO Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
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own DSM, which also resembles NAFTA in providing for consultation,
Commission intervention, and arbitration. 135 However, in contrast to
NAFTA, final decisions are binding on the Parties,1 36 and in this aspect
137
the G-3 DSM reflects a producing 10 model.
Disputes within MERCOSUR are to be settled according to an
international arbitration process, preceded by consultation and mediation
by the CMG. 138 As is the case with the G-3 DSM, the decisions of the
arbitral panel are binding on the states party to the controversy.3 3 The
Protocol also clarifies that the decision has the effect of res judicata as
to the parties to the dispute t4°
The CACM DSM also operates through an arbitration process. Under
Article 26 of the Treaty of Managua, members can bring disputes to the
Economic Council or Executive Council for resolution.' 4' If not settled
there, the dispute will be referred for binding arbitration. 42 The CACM
DSM, however, goes a step farther than other arbitration-based DSM's in
terms of the supranationality of its decisions. First, the arbitral panel is
composed of justices of the highest court of each member state, giving
the proceedings a more adjudicatory nature. 43 Moreover, the decision of
the arbitral panel concerning interpretation and application of the Treaty

135. G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 19-05 to 19-19.
136. For disputes not directly related to G-3 obligations, however, Colombia and
Venezuela are bound to follow the provisions of the Cartagena Agreement. Id. art. 19-04. This
raises a troubling hierarchy of norms issue which will have to be faced by FTAA planners as
well. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
137. See G-3 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 19-16.
138. Protocolo de Brasilia Para La Solucion de Controversias [Protocol of Brasilia for the
Solution of Controversies], arts. 2,4,7, 6 INTER-AM. LEG. MAT. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Protocol
of Brasilia]. Annex III of the Treaty of Asunci6n set out an interim DSM involving "binding
mediation" by the Common Market Group and Council. Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 5,
Annex III. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Treaty of Asunci6n, the Parties negotiated and in 1993
enacted the Protocol of Brasilia, setting forth MERCOSUR's definitive DSM rules. Id. art. 18.
139. Protocol of Brasilia, supra note 138, art. 21. However it has been elsewhere noted
in connection with problems attendant to negotiation of a new MERCOSUR-ANCOM
agreement that Brazil's constitution prohibits the decisions of international bodies from
overriding Brazilian law. See MERCOSUR, Andean Group Make Little Headway Toward South
American FTA, supra note 4, at 27. In connection with that negotiation, Brazil is raising this
issue to press for a NAFTA-style DSM, in which dispute resolution panel decisions are brought
forward as recommendations to the FTA commission. Id.
140. Protocol of Brasilia, supra note 138, art. 21.
141. Treaty of Managua, supra note 5, art. 26.
142. Id.
143. Whether or not the additional quasi-judicial elements in the CACM system render the
binding arbitration process correspondingly more effective cannot be determined empirically,
due to the flaws and failures of the overall CACM system. However, if the revitalized CACM
carries over this model of DSM and a meaningful practice develops, this may offer important
new alternatives for the FTAA process.

Winter 1997]

An Essay in Trade Governance

is res judicata for all member states, not just those which are parties to
the dispute.'44
The members of ANCOM established via a separate treaty the Court
of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement. 45 The Court has jurisdiction over
all disputes involving ANCOM norms, 46 including disputes brought by
member states or ANCOM institutions and, in appropriate cases, disputes
brought by private parties. 147 In principle the Court has significant
supranational authority. The Court "produces" judgements, and Member
states found by the Court to be in noncompliance with ANCOM norms
must take all necessary measures to come into compliance. 148 National
courts are required to refer questions of ANCOM law to the Court if
there is no further appeal possible of their rulings, and the interpretations
of the Court must be adopted by the referring judge. 49 In practice the
Court's effectiveness has been stymied by the general lack of political
cooperation and coordination among ANCOM states.' 50
C. Implications
It follows from the basic rationality assumption underlying regime
theory that states will tailor governance mechanisms to the particular
goals they have for the 10 generally. As informed by a mesoinstitutions
perspective, a regime analysis of governance involves an investigation
into the degree to which the 10 is intended to perform facilitative or
producing goals, and a critique of the effectiveness of the established (or
intended) governance mechanisms in view of those goals.
A preliminary analysis of trade institutions in the Western hemisphere
suggests as a general matter that parties intending to create an FTA establish primarily facilitative lOs, and parties creating a customs union or
common market establish an 10 with at least some producing capacity.

144. Treaty of Managua, supra note 5, art. 26. Because of the scope of the Treaty, these

decisions can involve sensitive issues affecting national interests, such as rules of origin,
disputes, and claims of unfair trade practices, making this provision all the more remarkable.
145. Andean Court of Justice Treaty, supra note 120.

146. These norms include the Cartagena Agreement, its protocols and instruments, the

Treaty itself, the decisions of the Commission and the Resolutions of the Board. Id. art. 1.
147. Id. arts. 19, 27, 29, 33. Actions which can be brought concerning these norms include
actions for nullification of acts of ANCOM institutions, actions for noncompliance on the part
of a member state, and requests by national courts for advisory opinions. Id. arts. 17-33.
148. Id. art. 25.
149. Id. arts. 29, 31. In theory, the ANCOM system resembles, quite self-consciously, the

highly successful judicial model developed in the European Community.
150. See O'Hop, supra note 97, at 160. As with the CACM, the additional effectiveness

conferred by this model to a regional integration system in a non-European setting remains to
be determined as the ANCOM system matures.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 18:357

In terms of governance, analysis of the NAFTA and G-3 decision-making
mechanisms suggests, along functionalist lines, that states consider a
relatively weak single-tier system to be adequate when establishing a
facilitative FTA and not contemplating a significant transfer of state
power, nor deeper levels of integration in the future. 15 1 In contrast,
analysis of the hemisphere's customs union and common market RTAs
suggests that states employ a two-tier decision-making system when
integrating beyond an FTA and creating a producing 10. The decisionmaking mechanisms of MERCOSUR, the CACM, ANCOM, and
CARICOM each is designed to play a producing role, with the "work
product" taking the form of "policy" or "norms" created through the twotier system. 152
Whether the political will exists to achieve the intended levels of
integration set for an RTA, and whether its institutions have been adequately designed to facilitate the parties' goals, remain two significant
questions.1 53 Nevertheless, the preceding analysis suggests as a starting
point that states contemplating a producing organization for trade liberalization and deeper levels of integration appear to adopt two-tier systems
of governance, in which an "executive" organ with some degree of
independence is broadly overseen by a "policy-making" organ, which
remains expressly in the control of the states-parties. 54 In contrast, free
trade systems adopting a strictly facilitative model and embodying more

151. Of course, considerably more comparative study would be needed to bear this out.
An initial comparison to the European Community's association program is consistent with this
observation, with qualifications. The first generation accession agreements, or "Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements," used by the European Community to link itself with the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe also use simple single-tier decision-making mechanisms, and
include modest integration goals up to, but not including, an actual FTA. See Garcia, Americas
Agreements, supra note 4, at 91 & nn.143-46. The second generation Europe Agreements
establish a two-tier system reminiscent of that established for the European Community itself,
although the integration system established by such agreements is an FTA only. However, in
this case, one of the goals of the agreement is to begin training the associating country in the
Community-style institutional system, which may account for the creation of the two tiers at
this FTA stage of integration. Id. at 94-96 & nn.170-76.
152. The supranational strength of each system, and consequently its real effective
producing capacity, varies with each system. See supra notes 106, 112-13, and 119-20 and
accompanying text.
153. For example, the consensus requirement limiting supranationalism in MERCOSUR
and CARICOM decision-making might go too far in limiting state power towards creating
effective producing organs. However, MERCOSUR has in fact succeeded beyond CARICOM,
and ANCOM, which has formal supranationalism beyond both, has failed, suggesting that
formal characteristics alone cannot explain the effectiveness of producing organizations.
Paradoxically, it may be that a consensus "brake" on decisional supranationalism may enhance
the possibility of developing normative supranationalism, as has been asserted with regard to
the EC institutions. See Weiler, supra note 95.
154. Again, more analysis is needed, but a comparison to Europe Agreements bears this
out. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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limited integration goals seem to adopt single tier governance mechanisms, without a significant norm-creating capacity.
Turning to dispute resolution, the relatively consistent correlation
between integration goals and institutional design found in decisionmaking among hemispheric RTAs is not to be found at first glance with
regard to their dispute resolution systems. Whereas both hemispheric
FTAs (NAFTA and G-3) have relatively simple arbitration-style DSMs,
the DSMs of the CACM and MERCOSUR (both intended to be common
markets) are also arbitration-based. Moreover, arbitral decisions are
binding in the G-3 while non-binding in NAFTA. Whereas three of four
common markets (ANCOM, CACM, and MERCOSUR) also have
binding DSMs, CARICOM's DSM is nonbinding and resembles NAFTA
more than its sister common markets. Finally, the ANCOM system is
more judicialized in design than those of its sister common markets, or
any other hemispheric RTA for that matter.
Overall, however, there does appear to be a trend in the hemisphere
towards binding dispute resolution in an arbitration model. The most
important variable at work in DSM design appears to be the willingness
of the parties to submit themselves to binding decisions arising from
international dispute resolution. In mesoinstitutions terms, parties face a
decision involving the costs of such binding dispute resolution (loss of
discretion, increased institutional costs, etc) and its benefits (predictability, stability, legitimacy) against the costs and benefits of resolving
disputes more informally and diplomatically. That most of the hemisphere's RTAs have established a binding arbitration system suggests that
states have generally resolved the aforesaid calculus in favor of submitting their disputes to binding dispute resolution. 155 The fact that many of
these regimes nevertheless limit the supranationality of their decisionmaking mechanisms suggests that decisionmaking and dispute resolution
involve a separate calculus as to the costs and benefits of producing
capabilities and, perhaps, that states have more experience with-and are
more accepting of-supranationalism in an international arbitration
context than they do in the context of norm creation and decision-making
156
mechanisms.

155. Slaughter Burley cautions, however, that it is in connection with analyzing such
questions concerning when the costs of institutionalization (or increased institutionalization)
outweigh its benefits that IR theory in general shows one of its key weaknesses. See Slaughter
Burley, supra note 16, at 225.
156. It may be that the primary structural effects of the distinction between facilitative and
producing IOs are to be found in their decision making mechanisms, and only secondarily in
the DSM design, as arbitration style systems are prevalent.
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GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

Turning now to the matter of institutional design for the FTAA, the
decision on the part of the Summit countries to commit to the formation
of the FTAA represents, in mesoinstitutions theory terms, at least a
tentative decision that the costs of more centralized cooperation on
hemispheric trade matters may be outweighed by the costs of further
decentralized activity. 157 The question explored in this Article involves,
from a governance point of view, precisely how much centralization is
intended by the Summit countries, or desirable in view of their goals and
past integration practice in hemispheric RTAs. It is to these goals,
therefore, that we now turn.
A. The Summit of the Americas: Guidelines but Scant Guidance
1. Declaration and Plan of Action
a. Goals of the FTAA
The prinicipal Summit document, the "Declaration of Prinicples and
Plan of Action,"'' 58 sets forth certain broad elements to be addressed
through the FTAA process:
-"trade without barriers, without subsidies, without unfair
practices, and with an increasing stream of productive investments;"'

159

-an FTAA that "will build on existing subregional and bilateral
arrangements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric eco6
nomic integration and to bring the agreements together;"' 0
-"strengthened mechanisms that promote and protect the flow
of productive investment in the Hemisphere, and to promote the
6
development and progressive integration of capital markets;"' '
and

157. See Americas Agreements, supra note 4, at 103-04 & nn:214-16 (characterizing
existing hemispheric integration as decentralized).

158. Summit of the Americas: Declaration and Plan of Action, 34 I.L.M. 808 (1995).
159. Id. at 811.
160. Id.

161. Id. at 812.

Winter 1997]

An Essay in Trade Governance -

-"a hemispheric infrastructure" through sectoral negotiations "in
fields such as telecommunications, energy and transportation,
which will permit the efficient movement of the goods, services,
capital, information and technology that are the foundations of
prosperity. ,,I61
Item 9 of the Declaration's Plan of Action sets out a list of specific
trade policy areas in which "balanced and comprehensive agreements"
will be sought. These areas include tariffs and NTBs affecting trade in
goods and services, as well as the following: agriculture, subsidies,
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, technical barriers, safeguards, rules of origin, antidumping and countervailing
duties, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, dispute resolution, and
63
competition policy. 1

The Declaration and Plan of Action reveal that however comprehensive, the Free Trade Area of the Americas is intended to be no more
than its name suggests: a free trade area, not a customs union or common
market. The Declaration and Plan of Action present, in general terms, an
agenda for a market-oriented FTA, without any reference to deeper
integration at a future date. 64 This is in marked contrast to the goals of
several hemispheric RTAS, which as seen above seek to create customs
unions, and eventually common markets.
While it is not possible to conclusively determine from the Declaration and Plan of Action precisely how facilitative or producing an
organization is intended by the Summit countries, the statements of the
Summit countries suggest a facilitative FTAA, largely along the passive,
normative model: the embodiment of agreed-upon rules for hemispheric
trade. It is notable that no express reference is made to the creation of
strong central institutions to manage or even support the integration
process, beyond some mention of an FTAA that can "broaden and
deepen" hemispheric integration and "promote and protect" capital market
development.
b. Governance
While understandably vague on the particulars concerning the actual
structure of the FTAA, the Declaration and Plan of Action can be read to

162. Id.
163. Id. at 821. The coverage is as comprehensive as that found in NAFTA.
164. This goal is in itself challenging, but stops short of some of the more difficult issues
that would confront any attempt at deeper integration in this hemisphere, such as free
movement of workers and the coordination of macroeconomic policy.
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165
adopt, or endorse, a negative approach to governance within the FTAA.
In paragraph four of Item 9, the Summit parties "recognize that decisions
on trade agreements remain a sovereign right of each nation."' 166 This is
consistent with the approach favored by the U.S. and taken in NAFTA.
Beyond this suggestion, the Declaration and Plan of Action are
largely silent on the specific approach to governance which the FTAA
might take. Some form of central decision-making institution is likely to
be created, at a minimum to supervise the implementation of the agreement and, where necessary, provide a framework in which decisions can
be taken on agreement matters. Given the limited integration goals of the
FTAA and the approach taken to these issues in NAFTA, it is unlikely
that the FTAA's decision-making institutions will be significantly supranational.
With regard to dispute resolution, the Summit parties' emphasis that
167
"decisions on trade agreements remain a sovereign right of each nation"'
can be read to suggest that an FTAA DSM will not contain significant
supranational elements. However, in connection with the implementation
of agreements in areas covered by the Plan of Action, the Parties also
affirm that they "recongiz[e] the importance of effective enforcement of
international commitments."' 168 This suggests that designing an FTAA
DSM will involve a process of carefully balancing its desired effectiveness on the one hand, and a reluctance to cede national authority on the
other, in which the parties would do well to study
carefully their collec169
tive experience in existing hemispheric RTAs.

2. Ministerials
While the Summit Declaration did not set out a detailed plan for
achieving its many goals, 170 the "Immediate Action Agenda" of Item 9 of

165. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
166. Summit Declaration and Plan of Action, supra note 158, at 821.

167. Id. at 821, item 9.4.
168. Id.
169. This is echoed by the Parties' rather cryptic remark that dispute resolution is one of
the areas in which "balanced and comprehensive" agreement will be sought. Id. at 821, item
9.3. However, one commentator questions whether, in view of adequacy of the GATT/WTO
DSM, there should even be a separate DSM in NAFTA or the FTAA. Charles M. Gastle,
Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas: Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 735, 796 (1995); See also Chile-Canada
FTA Differs From NAFTA, but Could Aid Chilean Accession, supra note 4, at 21 (Chile and
Canada decide not to negotiate standards, IP and sanitary/phytosanitary provisions for bilateral
FA on grounds that WTO commitments adequate.).

170. Such a plan is not expected before the third ministerial, due to occur in 1997. Chaotic
Trade Ministerial Ends in Agreement on FTAA Declaration, INSIDE NAFTA SPECIAL REPORT,

March 25, 1996, at 1, 5 [hereinafter "Chaotic Trade Ministerial"].
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the Plan of Action 17 1 directs the hemisphere's trade ministers to take
"concrete initial steps" to achieve the FTAA, including the initiation of
a series of ministerial meetings for the development of short, medium and
long-term recommendations for implementation of the FTAA.' 72 .
Pursuant to this charge, the hemisphere's Trade Ministers met in June
of 1995 in Denver, Colorado (the "Denver Ministerial") and again in
March of 1996 in Cartagena, Colombia (the "Cartagena Ministerial").
While these ministerials have established eleven working groups and their
initial agendas, 173 they have postponed discussion of more substantive
issues to the third ministerial 174 and have not created a working group to
address institutional matters.175 Thus, the Summit process to date has
added little to the clues, discussed above, that are contained in the basic
Summit documents concerning the FTAA's approach to governance.
3. Summary
In view of the goals expressed by the Summit countries and their
minimal statements regarding institutional design, it seems that in
mesoinstitutional terms the FTAA is intended to play largely a facilitative
role, charged with supporting the Parties' integration efforts within a
framework that retains decision on trade matters as "a sovereign right of
each nation." It remains to be seen how this basic commitment will be
developed, in particular with regard to a governance mechanism that can
manage the decision-making and dispute resolution requirements of so
large and complex an agreement, even at a facilitative FTA level, within
the negative integration parameters set by the Parties.

171. Summit of the Americas: Declaration and Plan of Action, supra note 158, at 822-23.
172. Id. at 822.
173. The Denver ministerial established working groups to cover market access, customs
and rules of origin, investments, standards, sanitary measures, dumping and subsidies, and the
effects of integration on smaller economies. Trade Ministers' Conference Reinforces Commitment to Construct Hemispheric Free-Trade Zone, CHRON. LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., July 6,
1995, at I available in 1995 WL 2297474. The Cartagena Ministerial added four working
groups in the areas of government procurement, intellectual property, services, and competition.
Chaotic Trade Ministerial, supra note 170, at 5-6.
174. One of the key agenda items for the Cartagena. Ministerial had been to begin to
identify the strategy for building the FTAA, including the basic parameters of such an
agreement. See Cartagena Meeting Should.Give Definition to FTAA, IDB Economist Says,
INSIDE NAFTA, February 21, 1996, at 18. However, the Cartagena Declaration falls short in

this area, and does not even require that trade ministers decide when and how to start
negotiations at the next ministerial. Chaotic Trade Ministerial, supra note 170, at 5.

175. Also notably absent are working groups in the key areas of environmental standards
and labor standards, which have already proven contentious and controversial. See Chaotic
Trade Ministerial, supra note 170, at 5-6. The U.S. sought unsuccessfully to have working

groups in the latter two areas established at the Cartagena Ministerial. Id. at 1, 5.
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B. FTAA Governance: Basic Framework
Since it appears that the FTAA is intended principally as a facilitative
organization, the foregoing mesoinstitutions analysis of hemispheric trade
governance suggests that one should not anticipate that FTAA governance
mechanisms will enjoy any appreciable degree of state power with which
to accomplish their tasks. However, the Summit countries must still
determine the range of facilitative roles which the FTAA may be empowered to play, which will significantly affect the design of its governance
mechanisms. Moreover, the parties may opt for a limited producing role,
hence a certain amount of supranationalism, in connection with some
aspects of decision making and, in particular, dispute resolution, if that
is seen as rendering the FTAA institutions more effective within the
confines of the Summit countries' overall goals and tolerance for
supranationalism.
1. Decisionmaking
In determining the structure of an FTAA decision-making mechanism,
a basic issue to be resolved by the Summit countries involves the choice
between a single-tier system such as that of NAFTA and the G-3, and a
two-tier system like that of MERCOSUR, CACM and ANCOM.176 Since
it appears that the FTAA is intended to be a facilitative organization, the
analysis in Part I of this Article suggests that the Summit countries may
consider the adoption of a single-tier decision-making system as adequate
to their goals for the FTAA. If the FTAA decision-making organ will not
be charged with the responsibility or authority to "produce" norms or
coordination points, then there would appear to be little need for a more
177
complex two-tier system.

176. When undertaking a comparative study of governance mechanisms with a view
towards construction of a new 10, one must remember that, as a corollary of regime theory's

rationalist assumption, governance mechanisms cannot simply be "imported" from other
integration systems. Attention must be paid to how the governance mechanism of that other
system was designed in view of that system's goals, and whether those goals are similar to or

compatible with the goals of the system which the new governance mechanism is intended to
serve. This is no more than a plea for intelligent comparative analysis.
177. Moreover, since there is no equivalent to a second tier within NAFTA, and the U.S.

appears loathe to commit to the type of transfer of power necessary for an effective two-tier
system, it would be unlikely for the U.S to agree to initiate such a system in the FTAA absent
a compelling reason.
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a. The FTAA Commission
Following the NAFTA and G-3 model, the principal decision-making
and consultative organ of the FTAA could be designated the "FTAA
Commission." If the FTAA is structured as an independent, multilateral
agreement, then Commission membership would most naturally consist
of 34 government ministers representing the Summit countries.
Alternatively, if the FTAA is formed through some sort of linkage or
coalescence among existing RTAs, then the FTAA Commission could
consist of the NAFTA Commission and representatives of the primary
coordinating institutions of the other member RTAs acting as blocs.' 78 In
such a case, since NAFTA has no supranational institutions, NAFTA
representation on the FTAA Commission would be conducted through
separate representation of the three NAFTA parties' RTA representation
would depend on the authority of each RTA's institutions to represent
the RTA and its members in other institutions. 7 9 In general, it would
seem the most appropriate representative on the FTAA Commission in
such cases would be the body with highest overall authority for
policymaking in its respective RTA, so that the FTAA Commission
would have the widest possible authority within the respective legal

178. Although these might be the same individuals, they would be operating in a different
institutional context, with different considerations and accountability to different sets of norms
and expectations. This might be quite significant, for example, in the case of ANCOM, whose
Board is charged with operating for the best interests of the region as a whole, and whose
members are not operating under instructions. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. It
is interesting to note in this regard that in the current negotiations for a South American FTA
between MERCOSUR and ANCOM, the ANCOM countries are negotiating the tariff phase-out
schedules as a bloc rather than individually. Colombian Urges US Fast Track Action to Bring
FTAA 'Back to Life', INSIDE NAFTA, Nov. 13, 1996, at 6. Also, CARICOM leaders recently
decided to follow a bloc approach to negotiating free trade agreements with other trading
groups, citing the need for a unified, coordinated approach. CARICOM Leaders Agree to Field
Single Team for Trade Negotiations, INSIDE NAFrA, Oct. 30, 1996, at 4.
179. For example, the FTAA Commission could include the G-3's Commission and the
ANCOM Commission, ANCOM's highest body. For MERCOSUR, CACM and CARICOM,
representation on the FTAA Commission would be less clear because of the distribution of
competences within the two-tier systems found in these RTAs. In MERCOSUR, the Council
has overall responsibility for MERCOSUR policy, but the Common Market Group is charged
with the executive function and has an important role in international treaty matters. See supra
notes 100-03 and accompanying text. The Protocol of Ouro Preto provides that the Common
Market Group can, upon delegation by the Council, negotiate treaties on behalf of
MERCOSUR. Protocol of Ouro Preto, supra note 100, art. 14.7. In CACM, the Economic
Council has the overall responsibility but, again, important executive functions are fulfilled by
the Executive Council, including proposing new agreements. See supra notes 108-13 and
accompanying text. In CARICOM, the Council plays a primary role in the operation of the
common market but is still subject to the overall authority of the Conference of the Caribbean
Community. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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orders of its constituent systems, and decisionmaking could proceed with
a minimum of interference from other institutions.180
Even in an organization charged only with facilitative duties, the size
and ministerial level of such a Commission could limit meetings to once
a year and special meetings. 8 ' One alternative would be for the Commission to appoint an Executive Committee or Council at a lower ministerial
level to undertake certain limited action between Commission meetings
in much the same way that the pre-WTO GATT had a Council to act
between meetings of GATT Contracting Parties. 182 While technically the
governance mechanism would consist of two bodies, this is not the same
as a two-tier. system that has full and differentiated legislative and
83
executive roles.
b. The Commission's Scope of Action
Turning from composition to function, the division between single
and two-tier institutions reflects a deeper division between systems with
no significant producing role and consequently no appreciable' degree of
supranational authority, and systems which will play a producing role and
in which there is some capability for supranational decisionmaking. Since
the FTAA is likely to be principally a facilitative 10, it is unlikely that
the FTAA Commission would receive any broad grant of state power.

180. With reference to the RTAs discussed above in section I.B.I, that would be the
MERCOSUR Council, the CACM Economic Council, and the Caribbean Community's
Conference of Heads of Government. See discussion supra Part I.B.I. It may be the case that
for operational or other reasons the primary body of each two-tier system may wish to delegate
its authority to the second tier, usually executive, organ, in which case the primary organs
would need to affirm or ratify the decisions of the FTAA Commission. MERCOSUR, for
example, expressly provides for such delegation in the Protocol of Ouro Preto. See supra note
102. If so, the need for the RTA component of the FTAA Commission to then operate "under
instructions" from its primary organ is not that dissimilar from the need which the NAFTA
Party representatives on the FTAA Commission will have to operate under similar constraints.
181. Again reminiscent of the NAFTA and G-3 examples.
182. The GATT Council consisted of representatives of all willing Contracting Parties, and
was charged with certain consultative, support, and initiative roles between sessions of the
Contracting Parties. See JACKSON, supra note 82, at 154-56. This role has been carried over
in the WTO in the form of the General Council, which meets between meetings of the
Ministerial Conference. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993,
33 I.L.M 1144, 1145 (1994); see generally Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J INT'L L. 349 (1995).
183. Neither would an interim body exercise any decision-making authority with less than
full representation of all FTAA members. Otherwise such a system would amount to a
supranational decision-making process for any FTAA member not represented, and would move
the FTAA towards a producing model. However, if some such interim authority was to be
designed to operate with less than full representation, such an Executive Committee could be
structured to ensure that each Summit country was "represented" by the major state of its RTA,
together with, for example, one representative of the smaller economies, elected from among
themselves.
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Thus, the FTAA Commission would be probably constituted along the
negative lines of the NAFTA and G-3 Commissions." 4
At a minimum, the FTAA Commission should be charged with
'the same rather general duties given the NAFTA and G-3 Commissions:
to supervise the FTAA's implementation, oversee its further elaboration,
resolve disputes in its interpretation or application, supervise the work of
any committees and working groups, and consider any other matter
relevant to operation of the treaty.18 5 As an aid to its work*and to the
work of the FTAA parties, the Summit countries should equip the
Commission to play a supportive role by empowering it to supervise an
FTAA Secretariat 8 6 and any ad hoc committees or working groups, to
seek the advice of NGOs or individuals, and to take any other action
agreed to by the Parties 87 by adopting either resolutions or "decisions"
(which have no legal effect without subsequent implementation).188 In this
manner, the FTAA Commission would be equipped to carry out the
FTAA's facilitative mission by serving a consultative role, offering a
forum for consultations among the FTAA parties, and, to some degree,
a supportive role as well.
However, for the purpose of effectively driving the hemispheric
integration process forward, the Summit countries may wish to consider
forming a somewhat stronger institution than the NAFTA Commission.
The FTAA Commission could be given a power of initiative along the
lines of the G-3 Commission, enabling it to evaluate and report on the
results achieved under the Treaty and recommend to the Parties any
modifications it deems advisable, and, in general, to recommend to the
Parties measures it deems advisable to implement the decisions of the
Parties. 8 9
Moving farther towards the positive integration axis, the FTAA
Commission could be constituted with the clear power to make binding
decisions, and not merely to pass resolutions. Even if national action
remains necessary to implement these decisions on a national level, the

184. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
186. The Secretariat could be a separate institution, as in NAFTA, or it could be an
additional function added to the combined institutional capacities of the FTAA states' trade
ministries, as with the G-3.
187. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (NAFTA Treaty and G-3 Treaty).
188. NAFTA is unclear as to the extent to which, in a decision making role, the decisions
of the NAFTA Commission can be considered to bind the parties. It is clear that the NAFTA
Commission lacks the power to take decisions which have legal effect in the Parties' jurisdictions without further implementation. However, it may be that NAFTA Commission decisions
will nevertheless be considered binding on Parties as a matter of international law.
189. See supra note 89.
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FTAA treaty could clearly state that the decisions of the FTAA Commission are binding on the parties as a matter of the treaty, and that the
parties are required to take all necessary steps to implement these decisions in their jurisdictions." However, this would involve a shift towards
a producing model for the FTAA, at least in this limited respect, and this
may exceed the stated goals of the Summit countries.
c. Voting Procedures
With regard to the process for actually reaching decisions, the starting
point for negotiation will likely be a consensus requirement, as that is the
approach favored bythe United States in NAFTA, and followed by the
G-3 agreement as well. This approach is the most protective of FTAA
countries' sovereign power, and is most consistent with the position taken
in the Summit Declaration and Plan of Action that decisionmaking
"remain a sovereign right of each nation." 19
'
However, the Summit countries may wish to consider whether the
FTAA Commission should be able to proceed by some form of majority
vote short of unanimity.' 92 With such a large number of representatives
on the FTAA Commission, the existing consensus practice followed in
the single-tier systems of NAFTA and the G-3 would be difficult to
implement and could easily frustrate Commission action. 193 This feature,
more than simply clarifying the binding character of decisions, truly
raises the issue of supranationality, and for this reason is likely to be
opposed by the U.S. 94 Alternatively, it is possible to stipulate in the
FTAA treaty that the Commission, and/or any Executive Committee, may
act by majority or supermajority in certain limited cases, but will require

190. Of course, as long as decisions are to be taken by consensus, clarifying their binding
nature adds little. See infra Part II.B.l.c.
191. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
192. See O'Hop, supra note 97, at 162-63 & n.220 (discussion of various voting issues

and options).
193. It is not impossible to proceed under consensus rules, as the Summit countries have
done during the periodic ministerial meetings of the Summit process. However, this has

involved considerable behind-the-scenes diplomacy, and the demands on decision-making
processes during a protracted multilateral negotiation may not be comparable to those placed
on an institution governing the large and complex FTA which would result from that process.
194. It should not be an insurmountable difficulty to obtain U.S. approval for an FTAA

Commission with the power to make binding decisions. The U.S. accepts in principal membership in institutions which create binding obligations, since its dualist system gives it
flexibility in creating contrary domestic legal obligations, and the current consensus requirement
in NAFTA protects the US veto. However, if the FTAA Commission were to deviate from the
NAFTA Commission practice of unanimous decision making, the U.S. would lose its veto and
would be very likely to oppose such an institution.
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unanimity in other, specified cases, such as the creation of new obligations or the interpretation of the Treaty.
2. Dispute Resolution
It should be recalled that one of the principal functions of
mesoinstitutions, across facilitative and producing lines, is to assist in the
cooperative resolution of disputes among their participants.' 95 Facilitative
intervention generally consists of the traditional activities of good offices,
mediation, conciliation and factfinding.196 Binding intervention, as the
name suggests, involves the production of neutral findings of fact and law
that will bind the participants, usually through the medium of international arbitration.' 97
As is the case with creation of decision-making organs, the primary
decision to be made in DSM design involves whether to follow a
facilitative or producing model for dispute resolution. This Article has
characterized the NAFTA model as facilitative, despite its formal, arbitral
quality, because ultimately the parties retain final control over the
resolution of their disputes.' 98 With the exception of CARICOM, the other
hemispheric RTAs have adopted a producing model, with dispute resolution procedures empowered to produce binding results of varying scope,
implementation and preclusive effect. 99
Given the fact that the majority of the hemisphere's RTAs have an
arbitration-based DSM, it would seem appropriate and not especially
controversial for the FTAA Treaty also to establish, at a minimum, a
facilitative DSM built around consultation and the good offices of the
FTAA Commission, culminating in an international arbitration proceeding. This much would generally be consistent with the negative governance inclinations expressed by the Summit parties in the Plan of Action.
The main issue of contention would likely be the binding character
of the decisions of the arbitral panel. Effective integration depends not
only on the creation of appropriate institutions, but on the degree to
which participating states implement the decisions of those institutions .200
In terms of mesoinstitutions theory, it is clear that participant states

195. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.

196. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 26, at 37.
197. Id. at 47.
198. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
200. Francis G. Jacobs & Kenneth L. Karst, The "Federal" Legal Order: The U.S.A. and
Europe Compared-A Juridical Perspective, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, supra note 10,
at 199.
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engage in a cost-benefit analysis regarding, among other things, the
endowment of their institutions with producing capabilities. The NAFTA
states opted in the case of certain disputes (intergovernmental matters) for
a facilitative DSM, and in the case of others (antidumping) a DSM
capable of producing binding decisions.2"' While NAFTA and CARICOM
are the only hemispheric RTAs in which the decisions of the arbitral
panel are not themselves binding on the parties, the NAFTA approach in
particular is bound to be disproportionately influential due to NAFTA's
market power. 20 2
Mesoinstitutions theory does not predict, across the board, what level
of authority is ideal for a given set of participant goals and preferences.
IOs can provide valuable dispute resolution services at all levels of
facilitation and production. 2 3 Nevertheless, there may be grounds to
conclude that it would best serve the interests of the FTAA states if,
despite NAFTA's influence, the FTAA parties created a fully producing
FTAA DSM providing for binding arbitral decisions. This would seem a
minimum condition for effective dispute settlement in an agreement of
this scope.2 °" Moreover, such an approach would be consistent with the
hemispheric trend towards creating more formal and authoritative
DSMs. 20 5 Finally, to the extent that the decisions of the FTAA parties are
seen to be constrained by the norms of the system, as well as by the rules
of public international law, the FTAA's perceived legitimacy will be
enhanced. 2°6
A second issue to be addressed involves the status of arbitral panel
decisions regarding authoritative interpretation of the FTAA treaty. Under
NAFTA it is clear that the parties retain for themselves the authority to
interpret the treaty definitively independent of the dispute settlement
process. 20 7 Although disputes as to interpretation may become the subject

201. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
202. See Gastle, supra note 169, at 821 (NAFTA DSM "clearly will become the basis"

of the FTAA DSM.).
203. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
204. Gastle, supra note 169, at 807-808, 820 (FTAA DSM working group should
negotiate binding arbitration for F'AA DSM.). This level of commitment would seem
appropriate, based on the European Community's experience with Europe Agreements. See
Garcia, Americas Agreements, supra note 4, at 95 (Europe Agreements establish binding
arbitration.).
205. See Holbein & Carpentier, supra note 128, at 570. See also Note, Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Necessary Condition of Liberal Democracy, 81
GEO. L.J. 2369 (1993).
206. In this sense, the absence of binding arbitral decisions in the NAFTA Chapter 20
DSM can be criticized as undermining the perceived legitimacy of NAFTA as a whole.
207. The Commission, consisting of the governmental representatives of the NAFTA
Parties acting by consensus, has primary responsibility for resolving disputes regarding the
interpretation of the Treaty. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2001.2c.
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of dispute settlement proceedings, the decisions of the arbitral panel as to
interpretation of a treaty provision are not binding on the parties.. 8 In
contrast, in the CACM the decisions of the arbitral panel are resjudicata
for all parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty provision in
question, and the Andean-Court of Justice has broad interpretive powers
reaching down into the national legal systems of the members. 20 9
If the FTAA parties were to provide that arbitral decisions would
establish authoritative interpretations of the FTAA agreement binding on
all parties, this would move the FTAA farther towards a producing
model, at least in its dispute resolution functions, and increase the
FTAA's.supranationality. However, it is precisely this point which makes
it unlikely that the United States would agree to such a system, given its
preference for negative integration.. Nevertheless, if the FTAA system is
to be capable of developing influential norms to guide trade in this
hemisphere, then giving arbitral decisions the status of definitive treaty
interpretations could make the creation of such norms a more judicial and
less political process.
CONCLUSION

The mesoinstitutions approach to 10 analysis provides a valuable
bridge between an understanding of the perceived benefits and characteristics of regime formation in international relations and the actual
structure and function of institution-based regimes. Upon analyzing the
Summit countries' FTAA goals -from a mesoinstitutions perspective, it
would seem that the Summit countries intend the FTAA to play a
principally facilitative role. Therefore, a mesoinstitutions analysis of
existing patterns of trade governance in this hemisphere suggests that a
single-tier decision-making mechanism with the power to make binding
decisions might best serve the FTAA and accomplish the parties' goals.
This entity, which this Article terms the FTAA Commission, would also
have to play a role in the FTAA's dispute resolution process, which
should be a relatively straightforward system of consultation, mediation
by the Commission, and binding arbitration.
Creating a new level of trade governance, however, intensifies an
existing problem posed by overlapping RTAs in this hemisphere: the
potential for conflicting norms. 10 In the context'of the FTAA, such
conflicts might arise concerning the relative priority of decisions by the

208. Id.art. 2018.1.
209. See supra notes 149-51.
210. See Jacobs and Karst, supra note 200, at 225.
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FTAA Commissions and the decisions of the respective RTA institutions
to which the FTAA parties are also bound."'
One solution, simple but improbable, would be for the existing RTA
governance bodies to transfer powers to the FTAA Commission, then
disband.212 This approach would create the best chance for consistent
rulemaking. However, given the complex and specialized roles which
RTA institutions play in their systems, and the Summit countries' own
commitment to a continuing role for existing RTAs in hemispheric
integration even after completion of the FTAA,2 13 this option is probably
neither workable nor desirable.
Another possibility would be for RTA institutions to continue, but to
incorporate rules into the FTAA to allocate competence between the
FTAA Commission and other RTA institutions, and to provide rules for
resolving conflicts between the institutions.1 4 For example, one simple
but controversial plan would be for the FTAA Commission to retain veto
power over any RTA decision in an FTAA area. 2 5 A less contentious
alternative would be for the FTAA to contain provisions clearly spelling
out the priority of differing sets of treaty obligations when there is a
conflict. 21 6 Which obligations take precedence in a given case would
depend in part on the balance struck by the Summit countries between
regional integration and the FTAA effort.21 7
Perhaps the most critical issue to be determined by the Summit
countries is the degree of producing capability and resulting
supranationality necessary for effective integration at the hemispheric
level. If some producing capability is deemed necessary, and this Article
suggests several points at which it may be so determined, then the

211. This problem is already faced in the G-3 Treaty due to Colombia and Venezuela's

simultaneous ANCOM membership. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
212. O'Hop, supra note 97, at 162. This assumes all RTA obligations would be transferred
to the FrAA, and then the RTAs would essentially disband.
213. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
214. Id.
215. This would put acute pressure on the issue of RTA representation within the FrAA
Commission and Commission decision making generally, and would create numerous oppor-

tunities for conflict and friction.
216. NAFTA has such a provision in the case of conflicts between its rules and certain
environmental treaties. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 104. The G-3 is also a good example of this
approach, as many of its provisions clearly anticipate conflicts for Colombia and Venezuela
between G-3 rules and ANCOM rules.

217. Alternatively, the issue could be left to the general rules of treaty law for subsequent
inconsistent treaties, though this seems the least desirable result from an efficiency and
predictability standpoint. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, (1969), arts. 30,
39-41, 54, 57 and 59, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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willingness of the Summit countries, especially the U.S., 218 to accept the
necessary transfer of state power becomes critical to the success of the
FTAA project. The Summit Declaration and Plan of Action express a bias
towards the facilitative approach, while most Summit countries in their
own RTAs suggests a willingness to undertake such transfers when they
are warranted by the parties' goals and the circumstances surrounding the
particular integration effort. 2 9 The extent to which this becomes an issue
in the FTAA negotiations depends a great deal on the parties' calculation
of the minimum degree of authority required by FTAA institutions to
accomplish effectively the parties' goal of free trade throughout the hemisphere.

218. The U.S., for example, may adhere to its strong negative integration position, which
cannot be said definitively ex ante to be a mistake. It may, in fact, be the case that an FTA of
this magnitude could be governed successfully entirely according to a facilitative model. If not,
then there is always the possibility of a further treaty specifically amending the FTAA to
increase the supranational decision-making power of the FTAA institutions as the hemispheric
integration system evolves and matures, in much the same way that the Single Europe Act
modified the European Community's institutions towards greater supranationalism in decision
making. For an illuminating analysis of the U.S. approach to supranationality and certain
constitutional challenges it raises, using the German federal experience as a model, see Patrick
Tangney, The New Internationalism:The Cession of Sovereign Competences to Supranational
Organizationsand ConstitutionalChange in the United States and Germany, 21 YALE J. INT'L
L. 395 (1996).
219. Even the U.S., as noted above, has proven willing to establish a supranational
mechanism, the NAFTA Chapter 19 anti-dumping panel review process, when it was judged
in the U.S. interest. NAFrA, supra note 5, ch. 19; see also supra notes 130 and 203 and
accompanying text.

